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THE U.S. BUSINESS CYCLE, 1867–2006: A DYNAMIC FACTOR APPROACH
Albrecht Ritschl, Samad Sarferaz, and Martin Uebele*
Abstract—We estimate a Stock/Watson index of economic activity to assess
U.S. business cycle volatility since 1867. We replicate the Great Modera-
tion of the 1980s and 1990s and find exceptionally low volatility also in the
Golden Age of the 1960s. Postwar moderation relative to pre-1914 occurs
under constant but not time-varying factor loadings, suggesting structural
change toward more volatile sectors. For comparable series, the U.S. post-
war business cycle was as volatile overall as under the Classical Gold
Standard, but much less so during the Great Moderation and the Golden
Age.
I. Introduction
THE Great Recession after 2007 is often seen as amajor departure from the muted business cycle volatil-
ity observed since the end of the 1979 recession. Dubbed the
Great Moderation, this pattern has been studied extensively
in recent research (see Kim & Nelson, 1999a; McConnell
& Perez-Quiros, 2000; Stock & Watson, 2002; Jaimovich
& Siu, 2008; Gambetti & Gali, 2009; Giannone, Lenza,
& Reichlin, 2008; Justiniano & Primiceri, 2008; Canova,
2009). The then recent adoption of inflation targeting was
a popular candidate explanation (“good policy”); an exoge-
nous reduction in shocks hitting the U.S. economy (“good
luck”) was one alternative, as were sectoral composition
effects and the possible effects of just-in-time delivery on
the volatility of output. A much wider historical interpreta-
tion also existed. In earlier research, DeLong and Summers
(1986) had argued for business cycle moderation in the long
run, observing that postwar U.S. business cycles had become
less volatile compared to the period before World War I, and
certainly so than in the interwar period. They already made
the connection to new macroeconomic doctrines, the IS-LM
paradigm informing monetary and fiscal policy after World
War II as opposed to the gold standard prevailing before
1914.
This paper is about studying moderation in the U.S. econ-
omy prior to 2006 in a long-term perspective, going all the
way back to 1867. We use panels of different sizes to identify
patterns of volatility along the time axis and across sectors.
Disaggregate postwar evidence studied by Stock and Watson
(2002) suggested time-varying volatility of shocks in both
Received for publication March 12, 2012. Revision accepted for publica-
tion January 5, 2015. Editor: Mark W. Watson.
* Ritschl: London School of Economics and CEPR; Sarferaz: ETH Zurich;
Uebele: University of Groningen.
Thanks are due to Pooyan Amir Ahmadi, Barry Eichengreen, Ayhan Kose,
Peter Lindert, Bartosz Mac´kowiak, Marco del Negro, Wolfgang Reichmuth,
Christina Romer, Harald Uhlig, and participants in several conferences
and seminars. Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
through SFB 649 “Economic Risk” at Humboldt University of Berlin is
gratefully acknowledged. Support also came from the Marie Curie Research
Training Network “Unifying the European Experience.” Dun&Bradstreet
Corp. generously provided data. A discussion paper version of this paper
was distributed under the title “The U.S. Business Cycle, 1867–1995: A
Dynamic Factor Approach.”
A supplemental appendix is available online at http://www.mitpress
journals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00530.
univariate analysis and a VAR, while time variation in the
coefficients played less of a role. Studying nominal data,
Cogley and Sargent (2005) found a role for increased per-
sistence of inflation rates, while Primiceri (2005) argued that
such changes may have had little effect on real activity.
We follow much of the recent literature in favoring dis-
aggregate data over prefabricated GDP aggregates. A strong
additional motivation in our long-run study is the increasing
uncertainty over the quality of these aggregates for more dis-
tant historical periods. Because the official NIPA series of
national accounts starts only in 1929, the database available
for constructing national accounts becomes progressively
narrower going back in time. Estimates by Balke and Gor-
don (1986, 1989) and Romer (1986, 1988) differed on the
amount of volatility in pre-1914 business cycles, with differ-
ent implications for postwar moderation. In addition, modern
research has characterized the pre-1914 gold standard as
a system of surprisingly sophisticated commitment mech-
anisms for fiscal policy that proved robust to financial crises
and high public debt levels (see Bordo & Kydland, 1995). In
the light of these findings, we set out to provide new mea-
sures of U.S. business cycle activity since the end of the Civil
War and identify periods of low volatility and their possible
connections to monetary regimes.
To obtain intertemporally consistent measures of eco-
nomic activity and its volatility, we draw on the literature
on diffusion indices (using a term of Stock & Watson, 1998)
of economic activity, distilled from a large panel of disaggre-
gate time series using dynamic factor analysis (DFA). Stock
and Watson (1991) developed an unobserved component
model for disaggregate series representing the U.S. postwar
economy, which replicates the NBER’s business cycle turn-
ing points. We adopt a variant of this approach for our work
and use the resulting activity index as our yardstick.
Factor-based indices of economic activity have become
popular because they reliably aggregate information from
highly diverse individual and disaggregate series and are less
affected by data revisions than national accounts. The same
issues loom large with historical data. Disaggregate series
are often abundant for historical periods. Usually, how-
ever, they do not match national accounting categories very
well, and the Census information needed for proper aggre-
gation is incomplete or even missing. As a consequence,
national accounts for historical periods (or, for that matter, in
emerging economies) have to be constructed from less-than-
representative proxies and may fail to efficiently exploit the
information that is available for the respective economy from
that period. Activity measures obtained through dynamic
factor analysis replace these index calculations with a statis-
tical aggregation procedure. Series that would be of limited
use in constructing national accounts can still be informative
about business cycle dynamics through their contribution to
the common component. To our knowledge, this approach
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was first employed for the long term by Gerlach and
Gerlach-Kristen (2005) for Switzerland between the 1880s
and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Sarferaz and Uebele
(2009) employ dynamic factor analysis to obtain an index
of economic activity for nineteenth-century Germany, com-
paring it to different chronologies based on reconstructed
national accounts.
To study the evolution of U.S. business cycle volatility
over time, we carry out two main exercises. The first cov-
ers the full sample from 1867 to 2006. We obtain aggregate
and sectoral factors, as well as real and nominal ones. The
second group of exercises examines the change in volatility
across the world wars. For the long-term comparison, we
include 52 time series available on an unchanged method-
ological basis. For the second exercise, we can employ up
to 98 such series. Data are taken from the Historical Statis-
tics of the United States (Carter et al., 2006), as well as the
NBER’s Macrohistory Database, which itself dates back to
the business cycle project of Burns and Mitchell (1946).
Factor models offer two ways to deal with time variation in
the indices computed. The Stock/Watson methodology relies
on drawing more than one common component, aiming to
map time variation into second and third principal compo-
nents. An alternative is to allow for time variation in the
factor loadings of a one-factor model explicitly, specifying a
law of motion and controlling its evolution through prior
assumptions on the variance of the underlying stochastic
process. We follow the second path, adopting the Bayesian
dynamic factor model of Del Negro and Otrok (2003, 2008).
In the context of our model, this is akin to modeling struc-
tural change, which in a long-term analysis like ours must
play a role. One of our principal findings is that we can
reproduce the conventional wisdom on postwar moderation
relative to pre-1914 when shutting down this channel, that is,
when assuming constant factor loadings. This result echoes
Romer’s (1986) finding that lack of adjustment for structural
change may induce spurious volatility in historical output
series.
While we can reproduce the traditional evidence on post-
war moderation under constant factor loadings, this is less
clear once time variation is allowed. Based on time-varying
factor loadings, the second principal finding of our paper is
that, indeed, the postwar business cycle may have been more
volatile overall than before 1914.
Not all long-run structural change can be captured by
changing index weights. The emergence of new indus-
tries and sectors brings in all the well-known problems of
intertemporal comparison. Our modeling approach makes
these issues explicit, purposefully limiting our research to
those groups of economic phenomena that admit like-for-
like comparison. Even within this narrower class, we achieve
clear results. A third principal finding of this paper is that
we replicate the standard evidence on the Great Modera-
tion after the 1980s (see, e.g., Cogley & Sargent, 2005;
Primiceri, 2005; Gambetti & Gali, 2009; Giannone et al.,
2008). Our results suggest that aggregate volatility during
the Great Moderation may not have been lower than dur-
ing the Classical Gold Standard. However, for some subsets
of the data we find volatility during the Great Moderation
to have been around 30% to 40% lower than before 1913,
and probably 50% lower in services. The major exception
is physical output in the nonfarm economy, although even
here, there is a sharp drop in volatility relative to the 1970s.
All of these results imply that the Great Moderation was
not merely due to new sectors that our panel cannot cap-
ture, although this effect certainly played an added role. We
do not find very strong postwar moderation in the nominal
series overall when compared to pre-1914. However, nomi-
nal series pertaining to the nonfarm economy were one-third
less volatile during the postwar period and 50% less volatile
during the Great Moderation than under the Classical Gold
Standard.
Stochastic aggregate volatility should be visible in all sec-
tors of the U.S. economy, both traditional subsectors and
more modern. The third principal finding of this paper is
that stochastic volatility of the U.S. economy since the Civil
War followed a hump-shaped pattern that peaked in the Great
Depression but built up significantly earlier and took a long
time to dissipate after that. This secular hump-shaped pat-
tern is very much the same across all subsectors of our data,
confirming that the shocks are indeed aggregate.
Changing business cycle volatility was accompanied by
changes in nominal volatility. Nonagricultural nominal series
were noticeably more moderate throughout the postwar
period, while agricultural prices may have been more volatile
than during the gold standard. The relevant principal finding,
though, is that the pattern of shocks to our nominal subset
of data is essentially the same as for the data set as a whole.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section II briefly sketches the Bayesian factor model and
discusses the specifications we adopt. Section III presents
the long-run evidence. Sections IV and V discuss changes
in volatility across the two world wars. Section VI concludes.
Technical derivations, data sources, and more detailed results
appear in the online appendixes.
II. A Bayesian Dynamic Factor Model
A. Setup
Dynamic factor models in the tradition of Sargent and
Sims (1977), Geweke (1977), and Stock and Watson (1989)
assume that a panel data set can be characterized by one or
more latent common components that capture the comove-
ments of the cross section, as well as a variable-specific
idiosyncratic component. These models imply that economic
activity is driven by a small number of latent driving forces,
which are captured by the dynamic factors. A Bayesian
approach to dynamic factor analysis is provided by Otrok
and Whiteman (1998) and Kim and Nelson (1999b), among
others. Del Negro and Otrok (2008) generalize the estima-
tion procedure to dynamic factor models with time-varying
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parameters and stochastic volatility. We closely follow their
methodology.
We describe the data panel Yt , spanning a cross section
of N series and an observation period of length T by a
one-factor model with time-varying factor loadings. The
observation equation then is
Yt = Λt ft + Ut , (1)
where ft represents a 1 × 1 latent factor, while Λt is a N × 1
coefficient vector linking the common factor to the ith vari-
able at time t, and Ut is an N × 1 vector of variable-specific
idiosyncratic components. The latent factor captures the
common dynamics of the data set and is our primary object
of interest.1 We assume that the factor evolves according to
an AR(q) process:
ft = ϕ1ft−1 + . . . + ϕqft−q + νt , (2)
with νt = ehtξt and ξt ∼ N (0, 1). The log volatility ht
follows a random walk without drift:
ht = ht−1 + ηt , (3)
where ηt ∼ N (0, σ2η).
The idiosyncratic components Ut are assumed to follow
an AR(p) process:
Ut = Θ1Ut−1 + . . . +ΘpUt−p + χt , (4)
where Θ1, . . . ,Θp are N × N diagonal matrices and χt ∼
N (0N×1,Ωχ) with
Ωχ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ21,χ 0 · · ·
0 σ22,χ
.
.
.
.
.
. · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
.
.
.
0
σ2N ,χ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
The factor loadings or coefficients on the factor in equa-
tion (1), Λt , are assumed to either be constant or (in the
time-varying model) follow a driftless random walk, as in
del Negro and Otrok (2003, 2008):2
Λt = INΛt−1 + 
t , (5)
where IN is an N ×N identity matrix and 
t ∼ N (0N×1,Ω
)
with
Ω
 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ21,
 0 · · ·
0 σ22,

.
.
.
.
.
. · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
.
.
.
0
σ2N ,

⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
1 Generalization to several factors is straightforward.
2 An alternative approach to capturing time variation is to specify multi-
factor models with constant factor loadings, where higher-order factors are
interpreted as correction factors that pick up the time variation.
and where the disturbances χt and 
t are independent of each
other.
The dynamic factor in this model is identified up to a
scaling constant. Following Del Negro and Otrok (2008),
we deal with scale indeterminacy by fixing the initial value
of the log volatility to h0 = 0.3
B. Priors
Before proceeding to the estimation of the system, we
specify prior assumptions. For the most part, these priors
are chosen as convenient initial conditions for burn-in of the
Markov chains, without affecting their steady states. Other
priors are informative and have a substantive interpretation
in terms of our research question, the time variation taken up
by the factor loadings rather than the factor itself. To tackle
this, we obtain results for different degrees of tightness of
these priors, varying from diffuse to rather tight. We adopt
priors for four groups of parameters of the above system.
These are, in turn, the parameters in the observation equation
(1), the parameters in the factor equation (2), the parameters
in the stochastic volatility equation (3), the parameters in
equation (4) governing the law of motion of the idiosyncratic
component, and the parameters in the law of motion of the
factor loadings, equation (5).
For the AR parameters ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕq of the factor equa-
tion, we specify the following prior:
ϕprior ∼ N (ϕ, V ϕ)
where ϕ = 0q×1 and
V ϕ = τ1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 · · ·
0 12
.
.
.
.
.
. · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
.
.
.
0
1
q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Analogously, for the AR parameters Θ1,Θ2, . . . ,Θp of the
law of motion of the idiosyncratic components, we specify
the following prior:
θ prior ∼ N (θ, V θ),
where θ = 0p×1 and
V θ = τ2
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 · · ·
0 12
.
.
.
.
.
. · · · . . .
0 · · · 0
0
.
.
.
0
1
p
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
We choose τ1 = 0.2 and τ2 = 1. Both priors are shrinkage
priors that punish more distant lags on the autoregressive
3 See Del Negro and Otrok (2008) for a more thorough discussion.
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terms, in the spirit of Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984). This
is implemented by progressively decreasing the uncertainty
about the mean prior belief that the parameters are 0 as lag
length increases. Related priors are employed in Kose, Otrok,
and Whiteman (2003) and del Negro and Otrok (2008).
For the variances of the disturbances in χt , we specified
the following prior:
σ2 priorχ ∼ IG
(
αχ
2
,
δχ
2
)
.
We choose αχ = 6 and δχ = 0.001, which implies a fairly
loose prior. IG denotes the inverted gamma distribution.
For the factor loadings, we distinguish two cases. With
constant factor loadings (disregarding structural change), the
relevant prior for each individual factor loading is
λprior ∼ N (λ, V λ),
where λ = 0 and Vλ = 100.
With time-varying factor loadings, for each of the vari-
ances of the disturbances in 
t , the prior is
σ2 prior
 ∼ IG
(
α

2
,
δ

2
)
.
Specification of priors relating to the factor loadings is
a key element of our research strategy. We adopt constant
factor loadings as one benchmark case and a diffuse prior
on σ2
 as the other. These benchmarks can be considered
as polar opposites. Under the first, no structural change is
allowed and all time variation is assigned to the factor ft .
Under the second, maximum structural change is allowed,
and it is (somewhat loosely speaking) left to the maximum
likelihood estimator to allocate time variation between the
factor, stochastic volatilities, and the factor loadings. For
the somewhat informative prior (α
 = 101 and δ
 = 0.1)
reported there (and throughout the paper), the factor load-
ings change gradually at frequencies well below business
cycle frequencies (see figures 2 and 3). We regard this as
a plausible description. However, by using a more diffuse
prior, for example, (α
 = 11 and δ
 = 0.01), it becomes
clear that nothing depends on this preference qualitatively.4
For the variances of the innovations in ηt , we specified
the following prior:
σ2 priorη ∼ IG
(
αη
2
,
δη
2
)
.
We choose αη = 101 and δη = 0.1.5
C. Estimation
We estimate the model by Gibbs sampling. In our case, the
estimation procedure is subdivided into four blocks. First,
4 Results can be made available on request.
5 We also experimented with less informative priors, for example, (αη =
11 and δη = 0.01), however without qualitative changes to the principal
findings.
the parameters of the model ϕs, θr , σg for s = 1, . . . , q,
r = 1, . . . , p, and g = χ, 
,η are calculated. Second, condi-
tional on the estimated values of the first block, the factor
ft is computed. Third, conditional on the results of the first
two blocks, we estimate the factor loadings. Finally, con-
ditional on the results of the previous blocks, we estimate
the stochastic volatility. After the estimation of the fourth
block, we start the next iteration step again at the first block
by conditioning on the last iteration step.6 These iterations
have the Markov property: as the number of steps increases,
the conditional posterior distributions of the parameters and
the factor converge to their marginal posterior distributions
at an exponential rate (see Geman & Geman, 1984).
We obtained estimates for lag lengths p = 1, q = 8, tak-
ing 100,000 draws and discarding the first 80,000 as burn-in.
Specifications with constant and time-varying factor load-
ings are reported alongside each other. Convergence of the
Gibbs sampler was checked using numerical diagnostics
and visual inspections. All convergence diagnostics con-
ducted were satisfactory.7 All series were detrended using the
Hodrick-Prescott (6.25) filter suggested by Ravn and Uhlig
(2002) for business cycle frequencies, and were subsequently
standardized.8
III. The U.S. Business Cycle in the Long Run
In this section we present results on the American business
cycle between 1867 and 2006 in its entirety. We are interested
in both volatility itself and its proximate sources. Volatility
in our factor model originates from two main sources, the
loadings and lag structure of the factor model itself, as well
as stochastic volatility operating on the model exogenously.
We consider them in turn.
Figure 1 is our representation of the American business
cycle between 1867 and 2006. It shows a one-factor model of
aggregate economic activity under time-varying factor load-
ings from 52 time series available on a consistent basis for
the whole period. The official NIPA series of GDP starting
in 1929 and a GDP estimate of Romer (1989) for 1869 to
1929 are shown for comparison. The factor is calibrated to
the standard deviation of the NIPA series from its HP (6.25)
trend for 1946 to 2006.
As figure 1 bears out, the factor captures the business
cycle turning points in GDP quite well. This is true for both
the postwar period and the historical business cycles and
the nineteenth century (see Davis, Hanes, & Rhode, 2007,
for details on the chronology). Differences with the GDP
data emerge around the world wars. The recessions of 1920–
1921 and 1931 come out more strongly in the factor than in
the GDP estimates. Also, our factor shows a much milder
increase in activity during World War II than the NIPA series
6 See the online appendix for a more detailed description of the estimation
procedure.
7 See online appendix C for a more detailed discussion.
8 We also experimented with λ = 100, as well as with Baxter/King and
first-difference filters, and found the qualitative results to be robust.
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Figure 1.—The U.S. Business Cycle, 1867–2006
Factor versus GDP (1869–1929, Romer, 1989; 1930–2006 NIPA). TVAR factor from 52 series. GDP
data are deviations from HP(6.25) trend. Time-varying factor loadings and stochastic volatilities.
of GDP. We discuss these results in more detail in sections
IV and V. We also see that the factor is substantially more
volatile during the interwar period than before or after the
wars. However, it is not obviously less volatile after 1945
than before 1914. This invites a closer look.
A. The Role of Factor Loadings
The factor shown in figure 1 is based on time varying fac-
tor loadings under our preferred, mildly informative prior.
Figures 2 and 3 show how these 52 factor loadings evolve
over our observation period. As can be seen, the factor load-
ings change smoothly over time while suppressing volatility
at business cycle frequencies. This result is robust even
under a very diffuse prior. The absence of cyclical compo-
nents from the loadings implies that volatility at the relevant
business cycle frequencies is indeed captured by the factors
themselves.9
Factor estimates as in figure 1, representing aggregate or
sectoral activity, are our yardstick for intertemporal com-
parisons of U.S. business cycle volatility. Table 1 compares
volatility of several such factors in the post–World War II
period to the pre–World War I era. Results are provided
for both constant and time-varying factor loadings.10 The
GDP estimates of Romer (1989) and Balke and Gordon
(1986, 1989), designed in different ways to backcast the
NIPA data on GDP backward from 1929, provide the relevant
comparison for the period prior to World War I.
In table 1, the volatility of all data is calibrated to NIPA
for the postwar period. Panel A provides results for the
volatility of GDP. For the pre-1914 period, Balke and Gor-
don’s GDP estimate is more volatile than post–World War
9 Results are obtainable from the authors on request.
10 Table 3 lists additional results for several sectoral subsets of time series.
II GDP, indicating postwar moderation in the U.S. busi-
ness cycle. This replicates the traditional postwar moderation
result that caught the attention of DeLong and Summers
(1986) and others. Romer’s (1989) estimate of pre-1914
GDP is less volatile, suggesting very little postwar modera-
tion relative to the prewar business cycle. In both estimates,
however, volatility during the 1960s and again during the
Great Moderation of 1980 to 2006 seems markedly lower
than pre-1914.
Table 1 also reports results from our factor model, always
for both time-varying and constant factor loadings. Results
obtained for the aggregate factor from all 52 series, obtained
under time-varying factor loadings and stochastic volatil-
ity as in figure 1, show no postwar moderation overall.
Indeed the postwar business cycle comes out as slightly more
volatile than before 1914. We do obtain the Great Moderation
after the 1980s, as well as the Golden Age of the 1960s with
its characteristic lull in business cycles. This result carries
over to most subsets of the data, with the interesting excep-
tion of the nonagricultural real series (see table 2), which
would suggest that output in the nonagricultural economy
was still highly volatile in the 1950s and only subsequently
experienced moderation.
By contrast, under constant factor loadings, there is some
(although insignificant) postwar moderation relative to pre-
1914 in the aggregate factor.11 The Great Moderation of
the 1980s and the Golden Age come out more strongly
than under time-varying factor loadings. This is particu-
larly true for the nonagricultural economy, in contrast to
the results obtained under time-varying factor loadings (see
table 1). Overall, the model under constant factor loadings
delivers the traditional result. Given that constant factor
loadings shut down structural change, this seems surprising.
An estimation procedure tilted toward ignoring composition
effects should yield higher, not lower, volatility. After all,
this was Romer’s (1986) point about spurious volatility in
reconstructed historical estimates of GDP.
This paradox is resolved when comparing our results for
constant factor loadings with those obtained under under
time-varying factor loadings. For the pre-1914 gold standard,
the volatility of many of the factor estimates is markedly
lower than when factor loadings are allowed to vary, and it
is equal across both methods for 1946 to 2006 by construc-
tion (see tables 1 and 2). This would suggest that Romer was
right: shutting down structural change in GDP estimates of
Balke and Gordon leads to an increase in volatility. Calcu-
lating these into the volatility data for the postwar period
mechanically but spuriously delivers postwar stabilization.
This result also carries over to aggregate stochastic
volatility (see figure 5 (bottom)). With time-varying fac-
tor loadings, stochastic volatility increases steeply from as
early as 1900 to the recession of 1921, and further until
11 These estimates were obtained allowing for stochastic volatility. Results
for constant factor loadings with constant variance are in the working paper
version of this paper or can be obtained on request.
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Figure 2.—Time-Varying Factor Loadings, 1867–2006
Part 1. Solid lines represent the posterior mean, and dotted lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles.
1933. Constant factor loadings, however, deliver a strong
fall in stochastic volatility before 1900 and a subsequent
increase, making the average level of volatility before 1914
appear much higher relative to the rest of the observation
period. As a consequence, postwar stabilization is much
more pronounced when factor loadings are kept fixed.
An obvious caveat applies. Underrepresentation of the
service sector in our long-term data set is one plausible
hypothesis to explain the overall increase in volatility. If
services are inherently less volatile than physical output,
the secular shift away from agriculture and industry toward
services would generate moderation in GDP through a com-
position effect. Both an aggregation procedure masking this
structural shift, as constant factor loadings would do, and
lacking representation of service sector data would generate
excess volatility. However, we notice that introducing time
variation into the factor loadings tends to increase rather than
decrease postwar volatility relative to the long-term average.
In addition, even in the tertiary sector data that we do have,
there is little evidence of postwar moderation, and the 1960s
again come out as less volatile than the Great Moderation of
1980 to 2006.
Results on the nominal series in our data set are again
sensitive to assumptions about time variation in factor load-
ings. A nominal factor under constant factor loadings is
akin to a Laspeyres price index. This index would indicate
increased nominal volatility in the postwar period. Such evi-
dence would be consistent with Balke and Gordon (1989),
who presented a novel GNP deflator that was substantially
less volatile before World War I than previous deflators, thus
challenging an older conventional wisdom about high price
volatility under the gold standard.
However, this evidence is again not very robust to intro-
ducing time variation in the factor loadings. Under time
variation in factor loadings, the postwar increase in nominal
volatility relative to the gold standard disappears. This would
lend renewed support to traditional views of price level
volatility under the gold standard. We notice that our nomi-
nal factor obtained under time-varying factor loadings tracks
and to some extent indeed predicts the CPI (see figure 4).
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Figure 3.—Time-Varying Factor Loadings, 1867–2006
Part 2. Solid lines represent the posterior mean and dotted lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles.
Still, the overall nominal factor exhibits comparatively lit-
tle postwar moderation except for the 1960s. This would
imply that monetary policy activism since World War II did
not do a much better job than the classical gold standard
in terms of stabilizing nominal aggregates or prices around
trends. This is probably not too surprising, as we find only
mixed evidence of postwar stabilization in real variables,
leaving little room for monetary policy to explain it. Leav-
ing agricultural prices aside, nominal variables did become
less volatile in the postwar period, including in the Great
Moderation and even more so in the Golden Age. However,
a look at the volatility patterns of the nonagricultural real
series under time-varying factor loadings leaves doubts as
to whether this nominal stabilization achieved very much
in terms of stabilizing the real economy, in an echo of the
results of Primiceri (2005).
B. The Role of Stochastic Volatility
Stochastic volatility hitting the model operates through
the state equation of the factors. We allow its disturbance
term to follow a random walk and restrict its variance only
very mildly. Results for the aggregate factor are shown in
figures 5 (top) under time-varying factor loadings and in 5
(bottom) under constant factor loadings.
Figure 5 (top) bears out a hump-shaped pattern of volatil-
ity hitting the U.S. economy between 1867 and 2006. The
salient feature of this graph is that the Great Depression of
the 1930s was not an isolated phenomenon. Volatility had
started to increase around the turn of the twentieth century
and reached its first peak during the early 1920s. During
the 1930s, it began a decline that continued unabated to the
end of the millenium. The Great Moderation of the 1980s
and 1990s appears only as a temporary, less-than-significant
acceleration of this process. Viewed in this perspective, the
Great Depression emerges as embedded in a secular event
that began before World War I and ended sometime in the
1960s. In contrast to the factor estimates shown above, there
was further moderation of macroeconomic shocks after that.
We notice in passing that the long-term decline in these
shocks all came to an end after 1995, and certainly so in
the early 2000s.
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Table 1.—Volatility Comparison, Post–World War II/Pre–World War I
Post–World War II/
1867–1913 1946–2006 Pre–World War I Post–1980/Prewar 1960s/Prewar
A. GDP
Balke/Gordon GDP-NIPA 2.47 1.85 0.75 0.47 0.40
Romer GDP-NIPA 2.07 1.85 0.90 0.56 0.47
B. All 52 series
Time varying (mean) 1.48 1.85 1.25 0.75 0.60
Time varying (SD) (0.22) (0.00) (0.19) (0.18) (0.14)
Constant (mean) 2.04 1.85 0.91 0.47 0.53
Constant (SD) (0.17) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
C. Nonagricultural Series
Time varying (mean) 1.58 1.85 1.17 0.72 0.65
Time varying (SD) (0.25) (0.00) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16)
Constant (mean) 2.12 1.85 0.88 0.45 0.50
Constant (SD) (0.16) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
D. Real series
Time varying (mean) 1.77 1.85 1.05 0.56 0.60
Time varying (SD) (0.28) (0.00) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15)
Constant (mean) 1.72 1.85 1.08 0.52 0.51
Constant (SD) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
E. Nominal series
Time varying (mean) 1.50 1.45 0.97 0.75 0.40
Time varying (SD) (0.48) (0.00) (0.19) (0.19) (0.12)
Constant (mean) 1.09 1.45 1.33 1.03 0.57
Constant (SD) (0.11) (0.00) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
F. Nonagricultural nominal series
Time varying (mean) 2.21 1.45 0.65 0.50 0.40
Time varying (SD) (0.13) (0.00) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Constant (mean) 2.09 1.45 0.69 0.52 0.42
Constant (SD) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cyclical components of GDP series obtained from Hodrick-Prescott (6.25)-filter. Prior specification: α
 = 101; δ
 = 0.1 in the IG prior on σ
 in equation (5). Volatility of real series standardized to relevant NIPA
subaggregates for 1946–2006. Volatility of nominal series standardized to relevant sectoral GDP deflators for 1946–2006.
A somewhat different picture emerges under constant
factor loadings (see the bottom panel of figure 5). Here,
postwar moderation clearly exists and is an actual depar-
ture from an earlier, much more volatile state of the U.S.
economy that was only briefly interrupted by a temporary
lull in macroeconomic shocks toward the end of the nine-
teenth century. Even here, the Great Depression looks like
a secular phenomenon whose origins go back to before
World War I. But it is less unique relative to the nineteenth
century.
Drawing the results of this section together, we notice
that the patterns in figure 5 (top) broadly correspond to the
volatility patterns in table 1. This is reassuring, as our factor
estimate under time-varying factor loadings assigns much
reduced levels of volatility to both the factor estimate and
the stochastic volatility term for the classical gold standard.
Conversely, the much higher volatility levels from 1867 to
1913 for the factor under constant loadings are reflected in
higher stochastic volatility as well. This is consistent with
our interpretation that much of the disappearance of postwar
moderation in our estimates is due to the substantial down-
ward revision of volatility we find for the period of the gold
standard before 1914.
IV. The U.S. Business Cycle across World War I
As a robustness check for the above results, this section
focuses on changes in business cycle volatility across World
War I. Comparing the pre-1914 years with the interwar
period has several advantages. First, it allows us to use a
substantially larger data set of 98 series covering the period
from 1867 to 1939 on a consistent basis. Second, choosing
the interwar years as the reference period also eliminates
possible bias in representing postwar volatility. The GNP
data in Balke and Gordon (1986, 1989) bear out a substantial
increase in volatility across World War I, while the estimates
by Romer (1988) suggest the increase was much weaker. The
discrepancy between their findings is partly related to the
recession of 1920–1921, which is rather mild in Romer’s
data. In contrast, Balke and Gordon (1989) report a more
severe slump.
We repeat the above exercise for the subperiods from 1867
to 1929 and 1867 to 1939 with the wider data set of 98
series. To maintain comparability, we also reestimate the fac-
tor model with the narrower data set of 52 series employed
in the previous section. Because time variation in the aggre-
gation procedure played such a central role in the previous
section, we will again examine constant and time-varying
loadings alongside each other. The volatility of both factors
is calibrated to that of the Balke and Gordon series, obtained
as the standard deviation of the cyclical component from an
HP(6.25) filter. Figure 6 shows the cyclical components in
both series alongside the factors from 1867 to 1929. Com-
parisons with Romer’s (1989) real GNP measure are shown
in the upper panel, while the lower does the same with the
Balke and Gordon (1989) GNP estimate.
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Table 2.—Volatility across World War II, 52 Series, 1867–2006: Time-Varying and Constant Factor Loadings
Deviation from 1867– 1914– 1930– 1946– 1946– 1960– 1970– 1985– Postwar/ Post–1984/ 1960s/
HP Trend % 1913 1929 1939 2006 1959 1969 1984 2006 Prewar Prewar Prewar
Romer GNP 2.07 2.78 5.62 1.86 2.79 0.98 2.06 1.16 0.90 0.56 0.47
Balke/Gordon GNP 2.47 4.10 5.62 1.86 2.79 0.98 2.06 1.16 0.75 0.47 0.40
All 52 series
TV 1.48 3.92 5.48 1.85 2.60 0.88 2.10 1.50 1.25 1.02 0.60
C 2.04 5.54 7.35 1.85 2.90 1.08 2.04 1.12 0.91 0.55 0.53
Nonagricultural series
TV 1.58 3.99 5.68 1.85 3.08 1.03 1.79 1.12 1.17 0.71 0.65
C 2.12 5.29 7.09 1.85 3.13 1.07 1.80 1.01 0.88 0.47 0.50
Agricultural series
TV 1.48 3.31 6.37 1.85 2.28 1.01 2.23 1.62 1.25 1.08 0.61
C 1.48 2.73 4.79 1.85 1.78 0.80 2.54 1.79 1.25 1.20 0.54
Real series
TV 1.77 3.98 5.44 1.85 3.02 1.08 1.88 1.08 1.05 0.61 0.60
C 1.72 3.60 3.92 1.85 3.43 0.88 1.54 0.80 1.08 0.47 0.51
Nonagricultural real series
TV 1.14 2.77 3.99 1.85 2.63 1.07 1.94 1.51 1.63 1.32 0.93
C 2.44 5.10 6.94 1.85 2.81 1.05 2.21 1.03 0.76 0.42 0.43
Agricultural real series
TV 1.41 2.70 5.18 1.85 2.23 1.74 2.30 1.28 1.32 0.88 1.24
C 0.82 2.06 4.34 1.85 2.00 1.74 2.43 1.40 2.26 1.70 2.13
Nonagricultural real physical series
TV 1.07 2.61 3.74 1.85 2.66 1.26 2.17 1.08 1.73 1.03 1.20
C 2.41 5.15 7.01 1.85 2.83 1.05 2.20 1.01 0.77 0.42 0.43
Nonagricultural real nonphysical series
TV 0.82 2.24 2.19 1.85 2.78 1.07 1.00 1.40 2.25 1.63 1.18
C 0.69 1.86 1.72 1.85 2.92 0.67 0.75 1.31 2.68 1.70 0.95
Nominal series
TV 1.50 3.79 4.35 1.45 1.41 0.61 2.02 1.34 0.97 0.88 0.40
C 1.09 3.11 3.77 1.45 1.33 0.61 2.08 1.34 1.33 1.23 0.57
Nonagricultural nominal series
TV 2.21 4.41 4.96 1.45 1.97 0.88 1.83 1.01 0.65 0.45 0.40
C 2.09 4.41 5.03 1.45 2.00 0.88 1.82 0.98 0.69 0.47 0.42
Agricultural nominal series
TV 1.34 2.62 3.32 1.45 1.34 0.67 1.97 1.42 1.08 1.06 0.49
C 1.20 2.49 3.38 1.45 1.34 0.65 2.00 1.41 1.21 1.18 0.54
TV = time-varying factor loadings; C = constant factor loadings. Time-varying factor loadings model and constant factor loadings model both include the stochastic volatility component in the factor equation. Prior
specification: (α
 = 101 and δ
 = 0.01) and (αη = 11 and δη = 0.01).
Figure 4.—TVAR Factor from Seventeen Nominal Series versus U.S. CPI
CPI data are deviations from HP(6.25) trend. Factor standardized to standard deviation of CPI (1947–
2007). CPI annualized and shifted forward by one year.
This comparison yields two insights. For the pre-1914
period, the Romer estimate of GDP seems to be more in
line with our factor estimates than the Balke and Gordon
estimate. For the period from 1914 to 1929, our factors are
closer to the Balke and Gordon series than to the Romer
estimate. This is particularly true for the slump of 1921,
which, according to the Balke and Gordon data, pushed the
cyclical component of output down by almost 9%, compared
to only 5% in the Romer (1989) estimate. We also note that
the factor indicates a major upturn in the second half of the
1920s, an effect that is missing from both of the rivaling GDP
estimates. This evidence would, however, be consistent with
a reconstructed index of industrial production by Miron and
Romer (1990).
Table 3 makes the outcome more explicit. The upper panel
shows the standard deviation of the cyclical components in
Romer’s and Balke and Gordon’s GNP estimates for subpe-
riods up until 1929. Because both series are spliced to the
official NIPA series of GDP in 1929, the standard deviations
of both series for 1930 to 1939 are identical. As before,
the standard deviation of the factor estimates needs to be
calibrated.
To do this, we choose two different approaches, each esti-
mating the factors over a different time span. Under the first
approach, the factor is estimated for the whole period to 2006
and its volatility calibrated to NIPA for 1946 to 2006. This
is the same strategy adopted in table 1. Results are shown
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Figure 5.—The U.S. Business Cycle, 1867–1929, Factor versus GNP Estimates
TVAR factors from 52 and 98 series, respectively. GDP data are deviations from HP(6.25) trend.
in panel A of table 3. The second approach is to estimate
the factor only from 1867 to 1929 and to calibrate to the
cyclical component of the Balke and Gordon (1989) series
(panel B). As we have more series available for this subpe-
riod, we conduct this experiment twice—once for the same
52 series that are available through 2006, the second time for
the wider data set of 98 series. This strategy also underlies
figure 6. Results are shown in the panel A of table 3.
Because the factor estimates are not recursive, truncation
of the estimation period affects the results for all subperi-
ods. Truncating to 1867 to 1929, the period of interest in
this section, makes for an unbiased comparison of volatil-
ities across World War I. Extending the estimation period
to 2006 risks introducing bias but permits calibrating the
factors to the volatility of the official NIPA data. As a
consequence, volatility in the pre-1929 years can then be
directly compared to volatility in the NIPA series for relevant
subperiods.
Three results stand out from these robustness checks. First,
the increase in factor volatility across World War I con-
sistently comes out higher than in existing GDP estimates
(table 3, last column). This result is robust to truncations
of the estimation period, as well as to widening the data-
base for the factor estimate from 52 to 98 series. It is also
remarkably invariant to the choice between constant and
time-varying factor loadings. The second main result is that
pre-1914 volatility in the factor estimates is always lower
than the Balke and Gordon estimate would suggest (table
3, first column). For the most part, the factors even suggest
lower business cycle volatility than implied by the Romer
estimate. This effect also obtains in the factor estimates cal-
ibrated to NIPA. In both cases, prewar volatility is close to
the postwar level of volatility (1.85; see table 1) and in many
cases markedly lower. The third main result is that volatility
during 1914 to 1929 (second column in table 3) is consis-
tently higher than estimated by Romer (1989) and is indeed
close to or even higher than in the Balke and Gordon (1989)
data.
V. The U.S. Business Cycle across World War II
Discrepancies between output and income-based esti-
mates of GDP exist also from 1929 onwards, when the NIPA
accounts set in. These official accounts are themselves a
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Figure 6.—Standard Deviation of the Residual of the Factor Equation,
1867–2006
Solid lines represent the posterior mean, and dotted lines are the 16th and 84th percentiles. The upper
panel shows results from a factor model with time-varying factor loadings and stochastic volatilities. The
lower panel depicts results from a model with constant factor loadings and stochastic volatilities.
compromise, leaning toward the Commerce Department’s
earlier output series. For the years around World War II, there
are again doubts about the volatility of this series. Alterna-
tive estimates by Kuznets (1961) and Kendrick (1961) show
less volatility than NIPA for 1939 to 1945. These income-
based estimates also suggest a less pronounced increase
in economic activity, as well as a different business cycle
chronology.12 The very large business cycle swings during
World War II implied by the NIPA data have generated
renewed interest because of their implications for the size of
the fiscal multiplier (see Blanchard & Perotti, 2002; McGrat-
tan & Ohanian, 2010; Ramey, 2011). In the following, we
zoom in on the years 1929 to 1949 and compare the official
national accounting figures with the income-based estimate
by Kuznets (1961).
In figure 7, the upper panel plots the factor against the offi-
cial NIPA accounts. The income estimate of Kuznets (1961)
12 For a discussion, see Kuznets (1945), Mitchell (1943), and Nordhaus
and Tobin (1972) and a review in Higgs (1992, p. 45).
Table 3.—Volatility Comparison across World War I, 1867–1929/1939
Deviation from 1930–1939 1914–1929/
HP(6.25) Trend 1867–1913 1914–1929 (NIPA) 1867–1913
GNP estimates
Romer 2.07 2.78 5.62 1.34
Balke-Gordon 2.47 4.10 5.62 1.66
A. 1867–2006 Data Set, Normalized to NIPA, 1946–2006
Factor 52 series
Time varying (mean) 1.48 3.92 5.48 2.66
Time varying (SD) (0.22) (0.48) (0.60) (0.22)
Constant (mean) 2.04 5.54 7.35 2.71
Constant (SD) (0.17) (0.38) (0.50) (0.18)
B. 1867–1929 Data Set, Normalized to Balke-Gordon, 1867–1929
Factor 52 series
Time varying (mean) 1.88 5.01 2.66
Time varying (SD) (0.11) (0.13) (0.22)
Constant (mean) 1.86 5.03 2.71
Constant (SD) (0.09) (0.10) (0.18)
Factor 98 series
Time varying (mean) 1.86 5.03 2.70
Time varying (SD) (0.10) (0.11) (0.21)
Constant (mean) 2.03 4.83 2.38
Constant (SD) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
Cyclical components of GDP series obtained from Hodrick-Prescott (6.25) filter.
is shown in the lower panel. Data are again detrended by an
HP(6.25) filter.
The factor estimate shown in this figure is obtained from
35 real series, identical to those examined in table 1 (panel
C). Simple eye-balling quickly delivers the message: until
1938, the business cycle turning points in the factor are very
close to those of both NIPA and Kuznets’s income estimate
(in passing, we note the earlier trough of the Great Depres-
sion implied by the factor). At the beginning of the war,
however, the factor tracks the Kuznets estimate much more
closely than the Commerce series on which the wartime
NIPA data are based, rising quickly from the trough in 1938
until 1941.
The official NIPA data convey a different impression: from
the lower turning point in 1940 on, they suggest an unprece-
dented rise in real output until 1944—almost at the end of
the war and one year before the Kuznets aggregate has its
lower turning point. From the peak of war production, the
economy according to NIPA fell into a deep recession that
lasted until 1949 while, according to Kuznets, a short-lived
postwar boom set in with a summit in 1946.
There is a wide gap between these rivaling business cycle
estimates in timing and volatility, but our real factor may
represent a reasonable compromise. While it leans toward
Kuznets’s alternative series until 1941, subsequently it devi-
ates by leveling off smoothly rather than crashing. After 1941
it matches NIPA’s timing with a short hiccup in 1944 and a
postwar trough in 1946. The short postwar revival, however,
rather favors Kuznets’s series again.
Search for deeper reasons for this discrepancy must be left
for future work. Methodological differences in accounting
for war output, as well as weighing issues in the construction
of the deflator, may have played a role.13 However, we note
13 See Kuznets (1952) for further discussion and Carson (1975) for details
on the debate.
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Figure 7.—TVAR Factors from Thirty-Five Real Series versus Rivaling
Estimates of GNP during World War II
GDP data are deviations from HP(6.25) trend.
that the factor drawn from 35 real series in figure 7 and the
broader factor drawn from 52 series, 17 of them nominal, in
figure 1, provide essentially the same result for World War
II. This suggests that deflating procedures are not a likely
candidate for explaining the differences between the Com-
merce series and the Kuznets estimates of wartime output
and income.
Summing up, World War II is the one period where our
factor exhibits marked deviations from the official NIPA
business cycle timing. However, this reflects an important
debate in U.S. business cycle historiography, which could
hitherto not be resolved yet. The cyclical behavior of our
real factor offers a compromise estimate and may help
reconciling Kuznets’s revisionist estimate with the official
historiography of the American business cycle during World
War II.
VI. Conclusion
Postwar moderation in the U.S. business cycle has been
elusive so far, and probably never existed. In this paper,
we reexamined business cycle volatility since 1867 using
a dynamic factor model. Based on a large set of disaggre-
gate time series, we obtained factors representing economic
activity at the aggregate level and for the nonfarm economy
and employed them to compare volatility across World War
I as well as in the long run.
One main finding is that the business cycle prior to World
War I may have even been less volatile than has previously
been thought and was perhaps also less volatile than the post-
war business cycle. We also find pervasive evidence that the
increase in business cycle volatility across World War I was
even larger than has been maintained in previous research.
Aggregate shocks to the U.S. economy, which we measure
by stochastic volatility, followed a distinct hump-shaped pat-
tern during the nearly 140 years we study. The anomalies
culminating in the Great Depression of the 1930s became
visible in the early 1900s.
This also has implications for the postwar period. In a pro-
cess that started in the 1930s and and petered out with the
Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s, aggregate shocks
to the U.S. economy gradually weakened, probably under-
cutting the levels of the late nineteenth century by the 1960s.
However, this did not immediately translate itself one-to-one
into reduced volatility of economic activity, due largely to a
long-term sectoral shift away from agriculture toward more
volatile industries.
For the years surrounding World War II we find indi-
cations that the standard figures for national output may
misrepresent the business cycle turning points and that both
the wartime boom and the postwar bust of the U.S. econ-
omy may have been weaker than suggested by the official
NIPA data in GDP. These findings confirm earlier results by
Kuznets (1961) and Kendrick (1961).
Many of our results derive from the analysis of time vari-
ation in factor loadings, the weights assigned to the various
individual series in constructing the index of aggregate eco-
nomic activity. To this end, we employ a Bayesian approach
to factor analysis, iterating over the likelihood function by
Gibbs sampling. Our approach nests both constant and time-
varying factor loadings. We obtain results for constant factor
loadings, as well as under informative priors allowing for
gradual time variation in the factor loadings. Our findings
suggest that once time variation is introduced, results are
clear-cut and indicate that the postwar U.S. business cycle
was probably more, not less, volatile than during the gold
standard era before World War I.
Our findings are related to earlier work that was based on
backward extrapolations of national accounts into the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century, but whose conclu-
sions on postwar moderation seemed mixed. Our approach
can be viewed as a way to provide an independent valida-
tion that is based on a different methodology and a wider
data set.
While there seems to be little evidence of postwar mod-
eration overall, we do reproduce the standard evidence on
the Great Moderation of 1980–2006, as well as the even
THE U.S. BUSINESS CYCLE, 1867–2006 171
lower volatility of the Golden Age of the 1960s. Within the
inevitable limits of a long-term comparison, we find that for
some subsectors of our data set, volatility during the Great
Moderation was markedly lower than before 1914. Volatility
was almost uniformly lower than during the gold standard
during the 1960s Golden Age.
We conclude on a skeptical note regarding postwar mon-
etary stabilization. For the nonfarm economy, we find sub-
stantial postwar smoothing of the nominal series relative to
the gold standard, very visibly so during the Great Modera-
tion and the earlier Golden Age. However, the evidence on
postwar stabilization in the real economy remains mixed.
Postwar monetary policy no doubt attempted to stabilize the
U.S. economy. But beyond the visible moderation of price
volatility itself, stabilization of the real economy since the
postwar period remains elusive.
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